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As corporations became the pre-eminent means of doing
business during the 19th century, Illinois courts needed to discern
the responsibilities of those entrusted to manage the owners’
investment in this new form of business organization. To do so, the
courts looked to equity and, in particular, the law of agency and
trusts. The early recognition of corporate fiduciary duties is briefly
explored in Part I of this Article for the purpose of showing what
would evolve into the relationship between corporate directors’
fiduciary duties and the judiciary’s rebuttable presumption of the
business judgment rule.1 This rule is designed to provide some level
of protection for corporate directors against lawsuits by disgruntled
investors.2

* Adjunct Professor, University of Illinois Chicago School of Law and
Managing Partner, Bauch & Michaels, LLC, Chicago. I am grateful for the
patient editorial assistance from the UIC Law Review, in particular Maria
Conversa, Erin Murphy, Brooke Payton, and Jesse Carbonaro. Also, I am
grateful to my business association, corporate law, and lawyering skills
students over the years who have taught me so much about myself and the
critical role lawyers serve in maintaining civility in our society, and to my
daughter Kayla who gives me a reason for everything else I do.
1. Model Bus. Corp. Act, 5th ed. § 8.31, cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
Courts have developed the broad common law concept of the business
judgment rule. Although formulations vary, in basic principle, a board of
directors generally enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment,
and its decisions will not be disturbed by a court substituting its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment if the board’s
decisions can be attributed to any rational business purpose. It is also
presumed that, in making a business decision, directors act in good faith,
on an informed basis, and in the honest belief that the action taken is in
the best interests of the corporation.
Id.

2. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 93 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991) (observing that
“[b]ehind the business judgment rule lies recognition that investors’ wealth
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Part II of this Article looks to the role of condominium
associations, a relatively recent form of property ownership, as notfor-profit corporations charged with managing the condominium
property. As discussed in Part III below, with the acceptance of
condominium property as a form of ownership was a recognition
that condominium association directors owed fiduciary duties to
unit owners.
This Article then examines, in Part IV, the impact of the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,3
which led to the legislative enactment and judicial recognition of
exculpatory clauses in corporate organizational documents
protecting directors from liability.4 Within months of this Delaware
decision, as discussed in Part V, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized in Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc. that such exculpatory
clauses in condominium declarations were enforceable.5 The
remainder of this Article explores the subsequent cases in Illinois
which have either followed or ignored Kelley.

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND
THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE IN ILLINOIS

Since at least 1875, the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized
that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to their corporations.6
One of the earliest reported decisions in Illinois recognizing
directors’ fiduciary duties was almost 150 years ago and involved a

would be lower if managers’ decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial
review”).
3. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding that board of directors breached
their fiduciary duty to the stockholders by failing to inform themselves of all
information available and relevant about a corporate merger and failing to
disclose all material information that reasonable stockholders would have
wanted to know in approving the transaction).
4. See generally Platt v. Gateway Int’l Motorsports Corp., 351 Ill. App. 3d
326, 330 (5th Dist. 2004) (observing that “[a]n exculpatory agreement
constitutes an express assumption of risk wherein one party consents to relieve
another party of a particular obligation”). Sometimes legislatures will adopt
legislation proscribing, prescribing, or permitting shifting liabilities through
exculpatory clauses in agreements. See Zerjal v. Daech & Bauer Constr., Inc.,
405 Ill. App. 3d 907, 912 (5th Dist. 2010) (recognizing that “[w]hen the
legislature has intended to regulate the liability of parties, it has done so; the
legislature has declared it to be against public policy for innkeepers,
professional bailees, landlords, and building contractors to be exculpated from
liability for their negligence”).
5. Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc., 106 Ill. 2d 505, 510 (1985).
6. See generally Gilman, Clinton & Springfield R.R. Co. v. Kelly, 77 Ill. 426,
436 (1875) (holding that a contract between a railroad and company which was
to complete construction of the rail system was unlawful because the certain
railroad directors later became stockholders and directors of the construction
company).
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railroad which, after selling stock and raising funds, subcontracted
out the actual work of constructing the railroad’s tracks in central
Illinois.7
The directors of a railroad company are, in an important sense,
regarded as trustees for the stockholders, and it would be a breach of
duty to transfer that trust, to assume obligations inconsistent with
that relation; to place themselves in opposition to the interests of the
stockholders, or in such position where their own individual interests
would prevent them from acting for the best interests of those they
represent. The rule is the same that applies to all persons acting in
any fiduciary capacity that requires the utmost fidelity to the
interests of the cestui que trust.8

The Gilman court had to determine whether three of the
railroad corporation’s directors could also be elected to serve on the
board of the construction company that had a contract to complete
construction of the railroad running from Gilman to Springfield,
Illinois.9 No evidence was presented that the construction contract
was fraudulent, though, given the railroad’s finances, the court
acknowledged that it was doubtful that there would ever be any
distributions to the shareholders bringing the action.10 As part of
the parties’ several transactions, the remaining unpurchased
shares of the railroad were transferred to the construction company
without consideration, a transfer which vested control of the
railroad in the construction company, even if the railroad’s stock
was essentially valueless and the railroad, which had lost money
and issued over $600,000 in municipal bonds to local governments
and $2,000,000 in bonds to mortgagees, was likely never to make a
profit.11
At some time after the construction contract was signed and
the stock was transferred, three directors of the railroad were
invited to join the board of the construction company and at least
two became stockholders in the construction company.12 Each of
these directors would likely profit from their role in the construction
company but at the time of this litigation the profitability of the
construction contract was not ascertainable. Looking to an equity
principle that prohibited a trustee from speculating in the subject
7. Id.
8. Id. at 434.
9. See id. at 432 (concluding that
Whether the contract was originally valid, is not now an important
subject of inquiry; for if it was illegal for the directors to become members
of the construction company, and participate in the profits, if any should
be realized, that fact would establish a right in complainants to have an
account taken, as clearly as though the contract, in the first instance,
was unlawful).
10. Id. at 431.
11. Id. at 430-31, 433, 436.
12. Id. at 432.
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of a trust, the court held that the directors could not serve on the
construction company’s board because the railroad had a contract
to finish the construction of the railroad by which any profits would
belong to the railroad.13 The directors’ duties to the railroad were
“in antagonism” with their interests in the construction company.14
Noteworthy is the court’s holding that the rule against
directors entering into conflicting relationships is so strict that the
court would not even consider a question as to whether the contract
was objectively fair or whether any actual damages ensued from the
breach.15 The position taken by the Gilman court in its strict
intolerance to any potential conflict of interest reflected the law
throughout our country at the time.16 Furthermore, the fact that the
railroad’s stockholders ratified the construction company’s contract
at a shareholders’ meeting did not estop the stockholders’ lawsuit
because the stockholders were never informed that the three
directors would be joining the construction company’s board while
continuing to serve on the railroad’s board.17 The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court’s decree finding the contract
between the railroad and construction company illegal and void and
the accompanying stock transfer void.18
The Illinois Supreme Courts’ reliance on trust law19 and a
trustee’s duties to infer the duties of corporate directors was not
only typical of early corporate law cases, but also extended well into
the early twentieth century as the law of business associations grew
from its infancy into its own.20 For decades law students have
13. Id. at 432-33.
14. Id. at 433.
15. Id. at 435.
16. Id. at 434. Gilman cited and quoted from a United States Supreme Court
opinion affirming, inter alia, that the administrators of a probate estate could
not purchase property from the estate. Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. 503, 555, 560
(1846) (beginning its analysis with the premise that “[t]he general rule stands
upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in relations
which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity”).
17. Gilman, 77 Ill. at 437. Here, we see an early example of the development
of corporate common law in the United States where today it is recognized that
shareholders may ratify a voidable, but not void, act of the directors. See
generally Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219-20 (Del. 1979) (summarizing
applicable law:
If shareholders have approved an otherwise voidable act, their approval
extinguishes any claim for losses based on prior lack of authority of the
directors to undertake such action . . . Shareholder ratification is valid
only where the stockholders so ratifying are adequately informed of the
consequences of their acts and the reasons therefor).
18. Gilman, 77 Ill. at 437.
19. See supra, text accompanying note 12.
20. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAWYER 35 (1966). Professor Marsh’s salient article
from 1966 which examined the evolution of rules applied to corporate directors.
Id. “In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in the United States
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reflected upon the meaning of Justice Cardozo’s (then Chief Judge)
“punctilio of an honor the most sensitive[.]”21
The court applied an equitable principle from trust and agency
law to declare the construction contract void.22 By today’s
standards, the results in Gilman would be considered extreme
because the court did not consider the objective fairness of the
construction contract.23 Although the court did not so say,
presumably it did not consider whether any causation or injury
resulted from the directors’ breach because it was providing
declaratory relief. Nevertheless, within the case’s several holdings,
one can see the foundation of the contemporary corporate fiduciary
duty of loyalty.
The strict rule recognized and applied in Gilman evolved over
the general rule was that any contract between a director and his corporation
was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders, without
regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.” Id. at 36.
It could have been stated with reasonable confidence in 1910 that the
general rule was that a contract between a director and his corporation
was valid if it was approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow
directors and was not found to be unfair or fraudulent by the court if
challenged; but that a contract in which a majority of the board was
interested was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its
shareholders without regard to any question of fairness.
Id. at 40.
By 1960, it could be said with some assurance that the general rule was
that no transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was
automatically voidable at the suit of a shareholder, whether there was a
disinterested majority of the board or not; but that the courts would
review such a contract and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and
would invalidate the contract if it was found to be unfair to the
corporation.
Id. at 43. See also John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of
the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145 (2016)
(calling for a re-examination of the history of corporate law in England and the
United States as an evolution of common law trusts).
21. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (stating
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior).
22. Gilman, 77 Ill. at 434 (recognizing that “the rule stands on the obligation
which a party owes to himself and his principal, that forbids him to assume a
position which would ordinarily excite a conflict between his individual interest
and a faithful discharge of his fiduciary duties”).
23. Id. at 435 (admonishing “So strictly is this principle [see supra, note 21]
adhered to, that no question is allowed to be raised as to fairness of the
contract”).

294

UIC Law Review

[55:289

time with courts recognizing breach of fiduciary duty actions
against directors who sat on both sides of transactions while also
allowing for the consideration of objective fairness in the
transaction. The evolution of corporate law in America has been
impacted by a more than one-hundred year debate in corporate law
as to the conflicts of shareholder, management, and stakeholder
primacy.24 This debate still thrives today.25
In Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc. v. Evans, the court continued to look
to trust law for guidance, although it recognized the question
presented as one of corporate law.26 In that case, the court reasoned:
The law is well settled that a trustee cannot without a breach of the
trust deal with its subject matter in such a manner as to make a profit
for his own benefit . . . The directors of a corporation are trustees of
its business and property for the collective body of stockholders in
respect to such business.27

However, the court acknowledged that in some circumstances,
the fairness of the transaction to the corporation and candor of the
directors in their disclosures would be considered.28 By 1960, the
Illinois Supreme Court clarified that it made no difference whether
directors were individually on both sides of a transaction or were on
the other side of the transaction through an entity which they
controlled, such as by sitting on the counter-party’s board.29 The
Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp court resolved a conflict
in Illinois cases holding that the interested directors on both sides
of the transaction had the burden of overcoming a presumption
against the validity of the transaction by showing its fairness.30 The
court also held that where the interested directors fail to show the

24. C.f. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
25. Compare Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in
2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAWYER 363 (2021) with Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy, 76 BUS. LAWYER 397
(2021).
26. See Dixmoor Golf Club, Inc. v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 623-24 (1927) (holding
that directors of a golf club were jointly and severally liable where they obtained
options to purchase land for a golf club for themselves and then, without
disclosure to the club members, sold the land to the golf club for 2.5 times what
they paid, and they also took undisclosed commissions on membership shares
sold to members).
27. Id. at 615-16.
28. Id. at 616-17.
29. See Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 281 (1960)
(reversing the appellate court and affirming chancellor’s decree finding
directors of building management corporation breached their fiduciary duties
where they controlled counter-parties on leases and directors failed to show the
fairness of the lease transactions and chancellor charged directors’ shares of
stock in the corporation with the liability).
30. Id. at 280-81, 283.
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fairness of the transaction, the court may either void the
transaction or award damages against the directors for losses
sustained by the corporation.31
A few years later, another person named Shlensky brought
what would become a textbook case on suing corporate directors for
the mismanagement of a corporation, Shlensky v. Wrigley.32
Plaintiff brought a derivative action against the directors of the
Delaware corporation which owned and operated Wrigley Field
where the Chicago Cubs play professional baseball.33 The complaint
charged that the directors, especially Philip K. Wrigley, who was
also president and 80% shareholder of the corporation at that time,
were negligent and mismanaged the team by refusing to install
lights and schedule night games.34 As reflected in the court’s
opinion, the plaintiff made a compelling showing how the
corporation was sustaining operating losses and financially
deteriorating by not hosting night games in comparison to the
heightened earnings of other teams, including the Chicago White
Sox, whose weeknight games drew a larger attendance than the
Cubs daytime games.35
Philip Wrigley opposed installing lights largely because of his
belief that baseball was a daytime sport and that installing lights
would deteriorate the neighborhood.36 The court’s analysis began by
observing from both Illinois and Delaware cases that corporate law
has long recognized that corporate directors serve the majority of
shareholders and that absent fraud or some other legal violation,
courts should not inject themselves into the affairs of managing the
corporation.37 Although it was likely that under the internal affairs

31. Id. at 283.
32. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 174 (1st Dist. 1968).
33. Id. at 175.
34. Id. at 174-75.
35. Id. at 175-76.
36. Id. at 176.
37. Id. at 177-78. Throughout the development of 20th Century corporate
law, courts have repeatedly recognized that they should not be second-guessing
management absent misconduct. Id.; see generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 2, at 93-102 (Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel reject the
common justifications that judges are not competent to review business
decisions or that such review will dissuade risk or talented people from
becoming managers; they conclude limits exist on the utility of liability rules to
assure contractual performance). Shlensky v Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d at 179-80
and Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 499-500 (1919) both quote from a
Michigan case cautioning judicial restraint:
Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of the directors
unless it is clearly made to appear that they are guilty of fraud or
misappropriation of the corporate funds, or refuse to declare a dividend
when the corporation has a surplus of net profits which it can, without
detriment to its business, divide among its stockholders, and when a
refusal to do so would amount to such an abuse of discretion as would
constitute a fraud or breach of that good faith which they are bound to
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doctrine,38 Delaware law should have controlled, the court never
addressed the question of controlling law and the remainder of the
decision relied upon Michigan and Illinois jurisprudence.39 The
court held for defendants, thereby refusing to substitute its
business judgment for that of the directors.
For example, it appears to us that the effect on the surrounding
neighborhood might well be considered by a director who is
considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games
if the park were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run
interest of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field
might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from
deteriorating. By these thoughts we do not mean to say that we
have decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one.
That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability.40 In effect, the appellate
court adopted the defendants’ argument that “the courts will not
step in and interfere with the honest business judgment of the
directors unless there is a showing of fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest.”41
In 1984, a bank shareholder brought a derivative action
against the bank and its directors alleging that they mismanaged
certain loans in the bank that were defaulted on and that the bank
president and board chair who was in ill health with heart disease
was overpaid (nearly $650,000 over a five-year period).42 After a
exercise toward the stockholders.
Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 83 Mich. 63, 71 (1890).
38. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (summarizing:
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a
corporation’s internal affairs – matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders – because otherwise a corporation could be faced with
conflicting demands.
(citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 302, cmt. b (1971)).
39. On the question presented, it did not appear that the results would have
changed notwithstanding the application of Illinois, Delaware, or Michigan law
in 1968. The Michigan cases discussed included the textbook case of Dodge, 204
Mich. at 507-08 and Shlensky, 95 Ill. App. 2d at 179. In Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., the Dodge brothers, as ten percent minority shareholders, sought to compel
Henry Ford to charge more for his cars to increase profits and to reverse his
policy of putting money back into the corporation rather than make shareholder
distributions. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 492-93. Ford argued that his ambition was
to hire more employees and spread the benefits of industrialization to more
people. Id. at 505-07. The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that “[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.” Id. at 507. However, the court was not persuaded that it should
interfere with the discretion of the directors is determining the expansion of the
corporate business. Id. at 507-08.
40. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d at 180-81.
41. Id. at 177.
42. Fields v. Sax, 123 Ill. App. 3d 460, 464-65 (1st Dist. 1984).
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thirteen-day trial, the court entered defendants’ motion for
judgment at the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, and plaintiff
appealed.43 The appellate court affirmed, recognizing what could be
described as the basis of the business judgment rule in Illinois.44
Directors must exercise that degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self-interest exercise in the management of their own
affairs . . . A corporate director will not be held liable for honest errors
or mistakes of judgment as long as the decision does not involve fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest . . . Further, where the acts complained
of are corporate decisions which fall within the purview of the
business judgment rule, this court is without authority to substitute
its judgment for the lawful decisions of the directors.45

The court analyzed the president’s health situation and the
evidence presented at trial showing all he had accomplished and
performed on a regular basis notwithstanding his heart disease.46
The court also analyzed the three substantial defaulted loans and
did not detect any wrongdoing in connection with accepting
settlements of sixty-six percent, seventy-five percent, and eighty-six
percent recovery on defaulted bank loans.47 At the end of this
opinion, language is found that Illinois courts would subsequently
use in describing the standard of liability for breach of fiduciary
duty actions in Illinois: “[a]bsent evidence of bad faith, fraud,
illegality, or gross overreaching, courts are not at liberty to interfere
with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.”48
In 1993, the Illinois Director of Insurance filed an action
against the outside directors of an insolvent insurance company
alleging negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty.49 The complaint
alleged a long list of failures by the directors in managing the
insurance company and pled that these breaches caused more than
$100 million in damages.50 Two defendant directors moved to
43. Id. at 462.
44. Id. at 467 (in analyzing the plaintiff’s allegation that the president was
over-compensated and that the board should not have settled the defaulted loan
claims as it did, the court began with the proposition that honest mistakes and
errors of judgment are not in themselves a basis for director liability).
45. Id. at 463-64.
46. Id. at 464.
47. Id. at 464-67.
48. Id. at 467. This language would be quoted in articulating the business
judgment rule in Goldberg v. Astor Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 2012 IL App. (1st)
110620 at ¶ 63.
49. Stamp v. Touche Ross & Co., 263 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1011 (1st Dist. 1993).
50. See id. at 1012-13 (listing the range of breaches, including failing to
develop and implement adequate procedures and controls with regard to
underwriting, reserves, collections; underpricing insurance and reinsurance;
failing to increase reserves or to set reserve liabilities; understating reserves;
failing to plan for or control large premium growth; paying excessive
commissions to managing agents; failing to oversee agent performance; failing
to require agents to keep accurate books and records; failing to draw down
timely on letters of credit; abdicating management responsibilities to other
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dismiss the breach count, which the court granted, relying on
Shlensky v. Wrigley because the complaint did not allege “any
wrongdoing bordering on fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest” and
therefore “the business judgment rule protected defendants from
liability for honest errors or mistakes in judgment.”51 In affirming
dismissal of the breach claims (but allowing plaintiff leave to amend
the complaint for reasons not relevant here), the appellate court
reiterated the Shlensky standard and then added from Fields:
The exercise of due care is a prerequisite to the applicability of
the business judgment rule and consequently directors may still be
held liable for damages caused by their lack of due care in carrying
out their duties. If due care is exercised, however, then the business
judgment rule is applicable to preclude director liability for
erroneous judgments absent conduct involving fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest.52
In Ferris Elevator Co. v. Neffco, Inc., the appellate court
clarified the role of the business judgment rule in Illinois as a
rebuttable presumption that was a “bursting bubble.”53 The court
rejected plaintiff’s argument that the business judgment rule did
not apply because plaintiff was challenging the process by which the
directors made a decision, not the decision itself.54
[T]he business judgment rule is a presumption that corporate
decisions made by directors are made on an informed basis and with
the honest belief that the course taken is in the best interests of the
corporation . . . The burden is on the party challenging the decision
to present facts rebutting the presumption . . . Illinois follows the
bursting bubble theory, which provides that once evidence is
established which contradicts the presumption, the presumption
vanishes . . . Thereafter, because the presumption has ceased to
operate, it is error to instruct the jury with regard to the
presumption.55

Under the bursting bubble theory, the presumption of the
business judgment rule need not be pled as an affirmative or special

companies; failing to supervise the affairs of subsidiaries; failing to keep correct
and adequate books and records; violating specific provisions of the Insurance
Code; and failing to accurately disclose the company’s true financial condition).
51. Id. at 1014.
52. Id. at 1016 (citing Fields, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 460).
53. Ferris Elevator Co. v. Neffco, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 350, 355 (3rd Dist.
1996).
54. Id. at 354 (finding that
the business judgment rule is a presumption which applies to all
directors who allegedly fail to inform themselves before making
corporate decisions . . . Therefore, we hold that until evidence is put forth
which suggests that the directors failed to act on an informed basis, they
enjoy the presumption of the rule.)
55. Id. at 355.
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defense because it is not either.56

II. CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS TREATED AS
CORPORATE ENTITIES
A condominium association manages the land and common
elements owned by the unit owners.57 The Illinois Condominium
Property Act provides that an association may be incorporated as
an Illinois not-for-profit corporation.58 Even if the association does
not incorporate as such, it still has the powers and responsibilities
of an Illinois not-for-profit corporation.59 Once an association is
incorporated, its board of managers is usually referred to as a board
of directors.60 In practice, the terms “board of managers” and “board
of directors” have become interchangeable and refer to the same
deliberative body vested with administration and control of the
condominium property outside the units and the conduct of the unit
owners living in this collective housing environment.61
56. Id. at 355.
57. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.3 (2022) (stating that
The unit owners’ association is responsible for the overall administration
of the property through its duly elected board of managers. Each unit
owner shall be a member of the association . . . The association shall have
and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect any or all of the
purposes for which the association is organized, and to do every other act
not inconsistent with law which may be appropriate to promote and
attain the purposes set forth in this Act or in the condominium
instruments.)
58. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.1(a) (2022) (stating that “[t]he
owner or owners of the property, or the board of managers, may cause to be
incorporated a not-for-profit corporation under the General Not For Profit
Corporation Act of the State of Illinois for the purpose of facilitating the
administration and operation of the property”).
59. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.3 (2022) (stating “[t]he
association, whether or not it is incorporated, shall have those powers and
responsibilities specified in the ‘General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986’
that are not inconsistent with this Act or the condominium instruments,
including but not limited to the power to acquire and hold title to land”).
60. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.3 (2022) (stating that
The board of directors of such corporation shall constitute the board of
managers provided for in this Act, and all of the rights, titles, powers,
privileges and obligations vested in or imposed upon the board of
managers in this Act and in the declaration may be held or performed by
such corporation or by the duly elected members of the board of directors
thereof and their successors in office).
See also Robinson v. LaCasa Grande Condo. Ass’n, 204 Ill. App. 3d 853, 857 (4th
Dist. 1990) (stating that “The board of directors of a not-for-profit corporation
constitutes the board of managers provided for in the Condominium Act” (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 30, par. 318.1(d) (now codified at 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 605/18.1(d) (2022))).
61. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4(a) (2022) (stating that “[t]he
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III. CONDOMINIUM DIRECTORS OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In 1983, the Illinois appellate court recognized that directors
of condominium associations owed unit owners quasi-fiduciary or
fiduciary duties.62 The Wolinsky court did not rely on any
controlling authority for this holding or even discuss what it
identified as quasi-fiduciary63 or fiduciary duties. Instead, the court
referred to a prior Illinois case where a developer converting an
apartment building to condominium property was found not to be
in a relationship of special confidence with a tenant and therefore,
did not owe the tenant any fiduciary duties.64 The Wolinsky court
also referenced, without discussion, a law review article by a Florida
condominium lawyer and a condominium law treatise.65 The court’s
analysis recognized that the directors owed fiduciary duties
consisted solely of one paragraph.66
A fiduciary relationship exists where there is special
confidence reposed in one who, in equity and good conscience, is
bound to act in good faith with due regard to the interests of the
other . . . We believe that all condominium association officers and
board members become fiduciaries to some degree when they take
office . . . Because the association officers and board members owe
a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to the members of the
association, they must act in a manner reasonably related to the
exercise of that duty, and the failure to do so will result in liability
not only for the association but also for the individuals themselves.67
That same year, the Illinois General Assembly amended the
Illinois Condominium Property Act to recognize that directors owe
unit owners a fiduciary duty of care.68 “In the performance of their

board of managers shall exercise for the association all powers, duties and
authority vested in the association by law or the condominium instruments
except for such powers, duties and authority reserved by law to the members of
the association”).
62. Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App. 3d 527, 533 (1st Dist. 1983).
63. See generally Wolinsky, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 533-34. The court did not
elaborate on why it was characterizing the directors’ duties as quasi-fiduciary
or what it meant by this term. We can only speculate that the court recognized
that it was venturing into new territory in recognizing that essentially
volunteer directors of a condominium association owed fiduciary duties.
64. Jones v. Eagle II, 99 Ill. App. 3d 64, 72 (1st Dist. 1981).
65. See Wolinsky, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 533-34 (citing Wayne S. Hyatt & James
B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of
Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915,
946 (1976)).
66. See Wolinsky, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 533-34 (citing Jones v. Eagle II, 99 Ill.
App.3d 64, 72 (1st Dist. 1981) (quoting “[a] fiduciary relationship exists where
there is special confidence reposed in one who, inequity and good conscience, is
bound to act in good faith with due regard to the interests of the other”)).
67. Wolinsky, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 533.
68. Pub. Act 83-833, §1, eff. July 1, 1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 5424).
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duties, the officers and members of the board, whether appointed
by the developer or elected by the unit owners, shall exercise the
care required of a fiduciary of the unit owners.”69 This language was
appended to the end of section 18.4 of the Act describing the powers
and duties of the board.
One of the earliest opinions to address the fiduciary duties of
condominium directors was Robinson v. LaCasa Grande
Condominium Association.70 Plaintiff’s estate sued, inter alia,
individual directors of the condominium association in a case of first
impression for negligence in operating a swimming pool on the
condominium property where the ten-year-old plaintiff girl drowned
and died.71 The court’s analysis began with the premise that “an
examination of condominium association law in Illinois, still a new
area in this State.”72
The first issue that the Robinson court rejected was
defendants’ argument that § 108.70 of the Illinois Not For Profit
Corporation Act,73 which exculpated directors from liability except
for willful or wanton acts or omissions.74 Section 108.70 provided
such exculpation75 to directors and officers of not-for-profit
corporations (a) who served without compensation excluding
reimbursement of expenses, and (b) if the corporation was tax
exempt or qualified for tax exemption under section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.76 Defendants’ argument failed
because in the course of adopting a new § 52877 to the Internal
Revenue Code under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congressional
legislative history affirmed that a homeowners’ association is not
69. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4 (2022) (originally codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 30, par. 318.4). In Robinson, the court quoted the original
language of the legislation as: “In the performance of their duties, the officers
and members of the board are required to exercise, whether appointed by the
developer or elected by the unit owners, the care required of a fiduciary of the
unit owners.” Robinson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 857.
70. 204 Ill. App. 3d 853 (4th Dist. 1990).
71. Id. at 855.
72. Id. at 856.
73. Now codified as § 108.70(a) of the Illinois General Not For Profit
Corporation Act of 1986, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.70(a) (2022).
74. Robinson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 857-59.
75. Id. at 858 (summarizing certain requisites under § 108.70:
To exempt the board of managers from liability under this statute,
several prerequisites must be met. First, the directors must serve
without compensation. Second, the corporation must be organized under
the Not For Profit Corporation Act. Next, the corporation must be
exempt from or qualify for exemption from taxation under Federal law .
. . If these requisites are satisfied, then the analysis moves to the final
requirement: the conduct of the directors or officers must not have been
willful or wanton).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2022).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 528 (2022) (exempting qualifying
condominium, and timeshare associations from income tax).

homeowners’,
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qualified as a § 501(c) organization unless the common areas and
facilities it maintains are for the use and enjoyment of the general
public.78 In Robinson, the condominium association’s common areas
were not open to the general public.79
The second issue addressed by Robinson was whether the
association’s corporate directors could be liable for negligent
performance of their duties.80 The court found that the directors
could not be liable for negligence because they were fiduciaries of
the unit owners, and therefore they could not be liable in tort for
breaches of their fiduciary duties.81
The members of the board of managers cannot be liable for negligent
performance of their duties. The Condominium Act specifically makes
the members of the board of managers fiduciaries of the unit owners
. . . The law in Illinois is that breach of a fiduciary duty is not a tort.
The Illinois Supreme Court has regarded the breach of fiduciary duty
as controlled by the substantive laws of agency, contract and equity
[as opposed to tort law].82

Where unit owners desire to sue an association for
mismanagement, the means of doing so is through breach of
fiduciary duty actions, which in Illinois, as recognized by Robinson,
sound in contract, not tort.83 Carney v. Donley is an example of a
condominium case where board directors acted improperly but was
not found to breach their fiduciary duties.84 The board incorrectly
granted three unit owners the right to extend their balconies which
required breaking through concrete patios below and constructing
supporting posts on the common elements.85 A unit owner opposed
to the extension filed an action for injunctive and other relief,
although it is not clear from the opinion whether his action for
breach of fiduciary duty against the directors was a derivative
claim.86
In any event, the trial court granted summary judgment for

78. Robinson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59 (relying upon H.R. Rep. No. 94-658,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. At 326-32; S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 393,
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, pp. 2897, 3222-28, 3821).
79. Robinson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 859.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 128 Ill.2d 437, 445 (1989)).
83. Robinson, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 859 (recognizing that “[t]he law in Illinois
is that breach of a fiduciary duty is not a tort”).
84. Carney v. Donley, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (2d Dist. 1994).
85. Id. at 1003-04.
86. Davis v. Dyson, 387 Ill. App. 3d 676, 682 (1st Dist. 2008) (“[a] derivative
action is an action that a corporate shareholder brings on behalf of a corporation
to seek relief for injuries done to that corporation, where the corporation either
cannot or will not assert its own rights”) (citing Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161,
167 (1946) (summarizing that derivative actions arise from equitable remedies
where management, through fraud, nonfeasance, or other misfeasance, fails to
assert a corporation’s rights )).
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defendant directors and the association.87 The appellate court
reversed, entering summary judgment for the plaintiff because the
condominium declaration stated that any diminishment of the
common elements of the property required unanimous approval of
the ninety-one unit owners, which did not occur here.88 The court
also found that the board had not breached its fiduciary duty to the
unit owners in misconstruing the declaration because it properly
exercised its business judgment and therefore plaintiff’s request for
attorneys’ fees and costs was denied.89 In executing their duties, the
directors sought legal advice before reaching its decision, a director
interested in the decision recused himself from voting, and the
board relied on the legal advice (which was apparently wrong) in
making its decision.90 “Under these circumstances, [the court could
not] say that the Board acted unreasonably or failed to exercise
properly its business judgment.”91
In Goldberg v. Astor Plaza Condo. Ass’n,92 plaintiff alleged that
the association breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pay for and
effect the repair of her unit’s window frames and windows.93 The
appellate court began its analysis with a quote from Fields that
“[u]nder the business judgment rule, ‘absent evidence of bad faith,
fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching, courts are not at liberty to
interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate
directors.’”94 The court found that the board acted with due care in
informing themselves of material facts necessary to make their
business judgment because the board sought legal advice before
reaching its decision and relied on the advice.95 In what has become
in practice a leading case on breaches of fiduciary duty by
condominium directors, Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive
Condominium Association,96 the court echoed the quadruple factor
test for rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching.97

IV. LEGISLATORS ADOPT EXCULPATORY CLAUSES AFTER
DELAWARE DECISION
In late January 1985, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued a
corporate breach of fiduciary duty decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom,98
87. Carney, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 1005.
88. Id. at 1010.
89. Id. at 1011.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 2012 IL App (1st) 110620.
93. Goldberg, 2012 IL App. (1st) 110620, ¶ 14.
94. Id. at ¶63 (citing Fields, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 460).
95. Goldberg, at ¶¶ 64-65.
96. 2014 IL App (1st) 111290 [hereinafter Palm II].
97. See id. at ¶ 111 (reiterating the quadruple test).
98. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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that would send shock waves throughout corporate America.99 The
Van Gorkom decision caused an insurance crisis in the directors and
officers insurance industry and led legislators to race to develop
corporate protections for the corporate directors producing revenue
to the states through franchise and other taxes paid for the privilege
of being incorporated in each state.100 The facts of Van Gorkom are
long and involved meetings and negotiations over several months
for members of the Pritzker family to buy-out Trans Union
Corporation, a holding company primarily generating its earnings
in the railway leasing business.101
The case arose as a class action in the Delaware Court of
Chancery brought by shareholders of the defendant Trans Union
Corporation whose stock was purchased for cash through a merger
with a subsidiary of defendant Marmon Group, Inc.102 Money
damages were also sought from the ten individual directors of Trans
Union, some officers, and two members of the Pritzker family who
were owners of Marmon.103 As Justice McNeilly’s dissent in Van
Gorkom illustrates, the Trans Union directors in this lawsuit were
accused of breaching their fiduciary duties by failing to be
sufficiently informed about the transaction the five “inside” (that is,
employee) directors of Trans Union had been collectively employed
by Trans Union for 116 years and had collectively served as
directors for sixty-eight years.104
The five outside Trans Union directors were impressively
credentialled: all but one were chief executive officers of Chicago
corporations at least as large as Trans Union; collectively they had
seventy-eight years’ experience as chief executive officers; they had
served collectively on Trans Union’s board for fifty-three years; one
was an economist, math statistician, professor at Yale, dean of the
business graduate school at the University of Chicago, and
99. See generally Van Gorkom, infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of Van Gorkom in creating an insurance crisis and
leading to legislative action).
100. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (stating that
[A]s a matter of the public policy of this State. Section 102(b)(7) was
adopted by the Delaware General Assembly in 1986 following a directors
and officers insurance liability crisis and the 1985 Delaware Supreme
Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom. The purpose of this statute was
to permit stockholders to adopt a provision in the certificate of
incorporation to free directors of personal liability in damages for due
care violations, but not duty of loyalty violations, bad faith claims and
certain other conduct. Such a charter provision, when adopted, would not
affect injunctive proceedings based on gross negligence.).
101. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-70. Although this is a Delaware case, it
is a Chicago story complete with contract negotiations during festivities before
opening night at the Lyric Opera. Id.
102. Id. at 863.
103. Id.
104. Id. 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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Chancellor of the University of Rochester, and served on several
boards of well-recognized national and international corporations;
another director was a University of Pennsylvania law graduate
and had been president and director of several large corporations;
another was a certified public accountant and served on several
boards; another graduated attended Harvard and University of
Chicago business schools and served on seven boards of large
corporations; and another was a chemist who served as chief
executive officer and chair of U.S. Gypsum and had been involved
in thirty-one or thirty-two corporate takeovers.105
As Justice McNeilly summarized: “These men knew Trans
Union like the back of their hands and were more than well
qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments
concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a one-hundred
percent sale of the corporation.”106 The Delaware Supreme Court
began its analysis recognizing the Delaware standard of care owed
by corporate directors in a duty of care case, as distinguished from
a duty of loyalty case,107 and the standard of liability given the
business judgment rule.108
[A] director’s duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the
nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty. Here,
there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof
thereof. Hence, it is presumed that the directors reached their
business judgment in good faith . . . and considerations of motive are
irrelevant to the issue before us. The standard of care applicable to a
director’s duty of care has also been recently restated by this Court .
..

105. Id.
106. Id. at 895.
107. Fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors and officers may vary
among jurisdictions in the United States but are generally described as being a
duty of loyalty and a duty of care. One of the better descriptions of the
demarcation of fiduciary responsibilities into these two camps is contained in §
8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which defines the standards of
conduct of directors. Subsection (a) describes the duty of loyalty owed: “Each
member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director,
shall act: (i) in good faith; and (ii) in a manner the director reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.” Model Bus. Corp. Act, 5th ed. §
8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Subsection (b) describes the duty of care owed:
“The members of the board of directors or a board committee, when becoming
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting
attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care
that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under
similar circumstances.” Model Bus. Corp. Act, 5th ed. § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020).
108. Id. at 872. One way of visualizing the relationship of these rules is to
imagine the standard of care as the base upon which the presumption of the
business judgment rule is laid to isolate these activities constituting a breach
of the standard of care (suppose negligence) from liability. To obtain liability,
the plaintiff needs to puncture the rebuttable presumption by proving the
standard of liability, which is an elevated standard (suppose gross negligence).
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While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the
applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts
of gross negligence. We again confirm that view. We think the concept
of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining
whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an
informed one.109

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery
and held that the board of directors’ approval of the merger was not
an informed business judgment; that their subsequent efforts to
amend the merger agreement were ineffectual; and that the board
did not deal in complete candor with the shareholders in obtaining
their ratification of the merger.110 The court entered judgment
against the individual directors “for the fair value of the plaintiffs’
stockholdings in Trans Union[.]”111
As noted above, the fallout from this decision holding directors
of a publicly-traded corporation personally liable for gross
negligence in exercising their duty of care in a merger was
enormous.112 As a direct result, the following year the Delaware
legislature amended the Delaware General Corporation Law to add
§ 102(b)(7) which permits a Delaware corporation add an
exculpatory clause to its certificate of incorporation “eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as
a director” provided that the exculpation may not include (a) a
breach of the duty of loyalty owed to the corporation and
shareholders; (b) acts or omissions not in good faith, or which
involve intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law; (c)
certain unlawful payments of dividends; or (d) transactions from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.113
States throughout the country adopted similar legislation in
their general corporation laws permitting corporations to add
exculpatory clauses to their charters.114 In Illinois, for example,
section 2.10(b)3) of the Business Corporation Act of 1983 currently

109. Id. at 872-73 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
110. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
111. Id.
112. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 107 (observing that “[i]t
is not hard to see why the case produced such a swift and sweeping reaction.
Judicial inquiry into the amount of information managers should acquire before
deciding creates the precise difficulties that the business judgment rule is
designed to avoid”).
113. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 and Supp. 1986).
114. James B. Behrens, Delaware Section 102(b)(7): A Statutory Response to
the Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 481, 482
(1987) (“[s]ection 102(b)(7)-type statutes broaden the scope of director protection
by permitting corporations to shield directors from liability for grossly negligent
acts. This type of statute differs from the typical indemnification provision
because it affects the shareholder’s cause of action”).
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has such a provision that is similar to that adopted in Delaware.115
Sec. 2.10. Articles of Incorporation. The articles of incorporation shall
be executed and filed in duplicate in accordance with Section 1.10 of
this Act . . .
(b) The articles of incorporation may set forth:
...
(3) a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that the provision
does not eliminate or limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach
of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders,
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) under Section 8.65 of
this Act, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or
limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring before
the date when the provision becomes effective.116

Neither the Illinois Condominium Property Act117 nor the
Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986118 contains
any provisions regarding exculpatory clauses in the organizational
documents. However, just a few months after the Van Gorkom
decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that exculpatory
clauses in condominium declarations were enforceable with certain
exceptions.119

115. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law relevantly
provides:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of
incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters: . . . (7)
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the
director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders; (ii) for
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title;
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability
of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such
provision becomes effective.
116. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10(b)(3) (2022).
117. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/1 et seq. (2022).
118. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/101.01 et seq. (2022).
119. Kelley, 106 Ill. 2d at 505.
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V. ILLINOIS RECOGNIZES EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN
CONDOMINIUM DECLARATIONS.
A few months after Van Gorkom was decided, the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized in Kelley v. Astor Inv., Inc.120 that
exculpatory provisions limiting or vitiating liability in
condominium declarations or bylaws are valid.
While it is true that the legislature has enacted an amendment to the
Condominium Property Act which provides that the “members of the
board are required to exercise, whether appointed by the developer or
elected by the unit owners, the care required of a fiduciary of the unit
owners”. . . there is no controlling precedent for the plaintiffs’
contention that the scope of such a fiduciary duty cannot be limited
by the declaration of condominium. Therefore, in order for the
plaintiffs to prevail against Astor under count II for breach of trust,
they must prove wilful misconduct on the part of Astor in performing
the duties required of it as the interim board of managers.121

In Kelley, plaintiff condominium purchasers in DuPage County
sued a developer, Astor Investors, and its three officers, members of
the Abraham family, who served as the interim directors of the
condominium association for three days before the unit owners’
board was elected.122 The condominiums were the product of an
apartment conversion project with very little rehabilitation work
done.123 After the closings of the units, the purchasers learned of
leaking roofs and structural defects in the project.124
After dismissal with prejudice, the plaintiffs appealed Count II
of their complaint relating to breach of trust against Astor and the
three Abraham family members and Count III for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability.125 The appellate court affirmed the
dismissals. As to the breach of trust action, the appellate court
found that the individual directors had served for only three days
and any wrongful conduct by the individuals took place before they
were directors.126 Additionally, as to Astor, the appellate court
found that it served as the interim board of managers and under
the condominium declaration, its liability was limited to willful
misconduct, which did not occur here.127 At the time of the litigation,
the Condominium Property Act had a provision substantially
similar to § 18.2(a)128 today which granted and imposed upon the
developer the same rights and duties as imposed on the board of
120. Id.
121. Id. at 510.
122. Id. at 507-08.
123. Id. at 508-09.
124. Id. at 507.
125. Id. at 508.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.2(a) (1999).
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directors elected by the unit owners.129
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed both the appellate and
trial courts below in dismissing both counts.130 As to the implied
warranty of habitability claim, the court accepted the appellate
court’s reasoning that such an implied warranty may apply where
there have been extensive renovations, but not under these facts.131
As to the breach of trust count, the Court upheld the exculpatory
provision in the condominium declaration, which stated:
Liability of the Board of Managers. Neither the members of the Board
nor the officers shall be liable to the Owners for any mistake of
judgment or for any other acts or omissions of any nature whatsoever
as such Board members and officers, except for any acts and omissions
found by a court to constitute willful misconduct in the performance
of duty.132

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that
the exculpatory provision would create a conflict between the
declaration and the Condominium Property Act’s duties imposed on
developer serving as an interim board of managers.133
We do not believe that the exculpatory clause violates public policy.
The plaintiffs have not cited, and we have not found, any attempt by
the legislature or judiciary to preclude a limitation on managerial
liability. While it is true that the legislature has enacted an
amendment to the Condominium Property Act which [imposes
fiduciary duties on the board members], there is no controlling
precedent for the plaintiffs’ contention that the scope of such a
fiduciary duty cannot be limited by the declaration of condominium.
Therefore, in order for the plaintiffs to prevail against Astor under
count II for breach of trust, they must prove wilful misconduct on the
part of Astor in performing the duties required of it as the interim
board of managers.134

On the question of enforceability of exculpatory provisions in
condominium declarations, Kelley has been followed in several
decisions. In Adams v. Meyers,135 based upon standing and other
grounds, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a unit owner’s
lawsuit challenging election procedures and budget issues. Among
the several grounds for dismissal was plaintiffs’ lack of standing
because they did not plead either demand upon the board to file suit
against the president or alternatively that making such a demand
129. Kelley, 106 Ill. 2d at 509 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, par. 318.2
(1981) (“[u]ntil election of the initial board of managers, the same rights, titles,
powers, privileges, trusts, duties and obligations vested in or imposed upon the
board of managers by this Act and in the declaration and bylaws shall be held
and performed by the developer”)).
130. Kelly, 106 Ill. 2d at 512-13.
131. Id. at 512.
132. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 509-10.
134. Id. at 510.
135. 250 Ill. App. 3d 477, 486 (1st Dist. 1993).
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would be futile which are required elements of pleading a derivative
lawsuit.136 The court also noted, in reviewing the Association’s
declaration and relying on Kelley, that the “Declaration expressly
provides that members of the Board shall not be liable for any
mistake of judgment or for any other acts or omissions of any nature
except for acts or omissions found by a court to constitute gross
negligence or fraud. Such exculpatory clauses do not violate public
policy.”137
In the context of condominium law, probably the most
thorough examination of an exculpatory clause in the declaration
arose in LaSalle Nat’l Trust, N.A. v. Bd. of Dir. of the 1100 Lake
Shore Drive Condo., where the appellate court affirmed, in part, the
trial court’s award of damages to a unit owner’s efforts to renovate
her unit.138 Citing Kelley, the appellate court observed that the
scope of board members’ fiduciary duties may be limited by an
exculpatory clause in the declaration.139 In this case, the declaration
provided:
Neither the directors, Board, officers of the Association, Trustee, nor
Developer shall be personally liable to the Unit Owners for any
mistake of judgment or for any other acts or omissions of any nature
whatsoever as such directors, Board, officers, Trustee or Developer,
except for any acts or omissions found by a court to constitute gross
negligence or fraud.140

This exculpatory clause is similar to that in Kelley except that
this carved out liability for gross negligence or fraud instead of
willful misconduct. The court noted that gross negligence was not
at issue in the case.141 What was at issue was whether the board’s
actions in interfering with and not cooperating with the renovation
project constituted fraud.
The trial court had found that the board breached its fiduciary
duties to the unit owner not because it intended to deceive the unit
owner (actual fraud), but because “the Board’s conduct surrounding
all aspects of the construction project and their extreme lack of
cooperation” constituted constructive fraud.142 The appellate court
rejected the board’s argument that the word “fraud” in the
exculpatory clause referred to “actual fraud” which is a tort, and not
to constructive fraud. The court found that the word “fraud”
referred to both actual and constructive fraud.143 Without
elaborating on its holdings, the appellate court used the term
“constructive fraud” to refer to a breach of a legal or equitable
136. Id. at 485-86.
137. Id. at 486.
138. 287 Ill. App. 3d 449, 458 (1st Dist. 1997).
139. LaSalle Nat’l Trust, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 454.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 454-55.
142. Id. at 456.
143. Id. at 455.
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duty.144 So by the trial court’s finding that the board members
breached their fiduciary duties, each of them engaged in
constructive fraud, and therefore the exculpatory clause would not
protect the directors from personal liability.145 The appellate court
did not address the fact that its reading of the exculpatory clause
rendered the entire clause meaningless.
It may be observed here that although Illinois does not
typically observe gross negligence as a standard of liability, instead
preferring willful and wanton misconduct, the Illinois Supreme
Court has recognized the two standards of liability are used in
Illinois interchangeably.146
Our jurisprudence has not been wholly consistent on the degree to
which negligent acts are considered similar to willful and wanton
behavior . . . For example, it has been remarked that willful and
wanton acts bear greater resemblance to intentionally tortious
misconduct . . . Other cases have observed that willful and wanton
behavior is more similar to an act of ordinary negligence . . . Our case
law has sometimes used interchangeably the terms “willful and
wanton negligence,” “gross negligence,” and “willful and wanton
conduct.”147

In Seven Bridges Courts Ass’n v. Seven Bridges Develop.,
Inc.,148 the appellate court held that the recognition of exculpatory
clauses in Kelley and LaSalle Nat’l Trust in condominium
declarations also extended to a townhome association.149 In
Glickman v. Teglia,150 the appellate court reversed the dismissal of
a slip and fall on stairs complaint, finding that although the
developer of a condominium was protected equally as board
members under a condominium declaration’s exculpatory clause,
such protection did not extend to the association itself.151 The
ramifications of the appellate court’s holding in Glickman that the
condominium association could be independently liable for
plaintiff’s slip and fall injury while also holding that the developer
and association’s directors could be exculpated from liability are
outside the purview of this Article.
It may be noted here that no language in the opinion indicates
that the condominium declaration even contained an exculpatory
clause. Rather, the court’s analysis was premised on practice notes
published with the annotated statutes indicating that many
associations have provisions in their declarations exonerating
directors from liability and that practically these provisions make
144. Id.
145. Id. at 457.
146. Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 161 Ill.2d 267, 274-75 (1994).
147. Id.
148. 306 Ill. App. 3d 697 (2nd Dist. 1999).
149. Seven Bridges, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 705.
150. 388 Ill. App. 3d 141, 143 (1st Dist. 2009).
151. Id. at 151.
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it difficult to impose liability on developers acting prior to the
election of the initial board of directors.152
Additionally, the appellate court concluded that the association
had a duty to maintain the common elements of the property prior
to the election of the initial board of directors.153 The conundrum
with the appellate court’s analysis is that it begs the question that
a corporation, like all artificial and legally-recognized persons, is
not a sentient or conscious actor. The not-for-profit corporation acts
solely through its directors, officers, and agents. The Condominium
Property Act does not empower and imposed duties on
condominium associations, but rather the Act empowers and
imposes duties on the board of directors.154 If the board of directors
is protected by the business judgment rule or exculpated from
liability, is not imposing liability on the association itself simply
disregarding and nullifying the business judgment rule or
exculpatory clause? It appears that no published cases have
addressed this question.
In Palm II,155 the trial court, addressing a declaration with an
exculpatory clause156 similar to that in LaSalle Nat’l Trust, found
that although the directors’ conduct and many violations of the
Condominium Property Act and condominium instruments did not
constitute fraud, the directors’ conscious disregard of their duties
constituted gross negligence and therefore breaches of their
fiduciary duties.157 This was because “they intentionally failed to
act in the face of a known duty, demonstrating a conscious disregard
for their duties.”158 As Justice Gordon noted in his concurrence, the
plaintiff did not seek damages from the individual directors, but a
declaratory judgment that their conduct violated their fiduciary
duty.159 Given the trial court’s finding that the directors were guilty
of gross negligence in performing their fiduciary duties, they would
not have been exculpated from liability had the plaintiff unit owner
sought damages against them individually.
In Boucher v. 111 E. Chestnut Condo. Ass’n,160 the appellate
court reversed summary judgment for the association and its

152. Id.
153. Id. at 150.
154. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4 (2022).
155. Palm II, 2014 IL App (1st) at 111290.
156. See id. at ¶ 137 (Gordon, P.J., concurring) (quoting the declaration:
Neither the members of the Board nor the officers of the Association
shall be liable to the Unit Owners for any mistake of judgment or for any
other acts or omissions of any nature whatsoever as such Board members
and officers except for any acts or omissions found by a court to constitute
gross negligence or fraud . . .).
157. Id. at ¶ 99.
158. Id. at ¶ 30.
159. Id. at ¶ 138.
160. 2018 IL App (1st) 162233.
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directors where the appellate court found that a unit owner’s vile
conduct and attacks on management employees were afforded First
Amendment protection and that the unit owner had a cause of
action for breach of his First Amendment rights under § 18.4(h) of
the Condominium Property Act.161 Additionally, the appellate court
found that genuine issues of material fact existed pertaining to
whether all but three directors (who did not participate in a
violation hearing) breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in
conducting the hearing against the plaintiff.162 Additionally, the
majority opinion rejected application of the declaration’s
exculpatory clause163 to justify summary judgment for the
defendants pursuant to following reasoning:
If courts interpret the exculpatory clause in the declaration so broadly
that it excuses decisions to withhold material information from unit
owners, the clause conflicts with the Act’s provision that board
members owe fiduciary duties to unit owners. While the declaration
may limit liability for business decisions made in good faith, it cannot
limit liability for violations of the duties of honesty, candor, full
disclosure, loyalty, and good faith.164

The appellate court cited Sherman v. Ryan165 for the
proposition that a declaration may not limit liability for violations
of the duties of honesty, candor, full disclosure, loyalty, and good
faith. However, Sherman v. Ryan is a case based solely on Delaware
law and the exculpatory statute under Section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. In Sherman, the appellate
court affirmed the dismissal of the third amended complaint
because plaintiff failed to plead bad faith as an exception to Section
102(b)(7) with particularity.166
In Kelley, the Illinois Supreme Court approved an exculpatory
clause which exculpated liability for all but “acts and omissions
found by a court to constitute willful misconduct in the performance

161. Id. at ¶¶ 14-21. Section 18.4(h) of the Condominium Property Act, 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4(h), empowers the board to adopt rules and
regulations pertaining to the operation and use of the property but prohibits
rules which impair first amendment rights under the federal or state
constitutions, including the free exercise of religion. The Boucher court found
that this proscription in § 18.4(h) created a statutory right of action for the unit
owner. Boucher, 2018 IL App (1st) 162233 at ¶ 21.
162. Id. at ¶ 64.
163. See id. at ¶ 51 (the clause provided that
The Individual Directors, Board, [and] officers of the Association . . . shall
not be liable to the Unit Owners for any mistake in judgment or for any
other acts or omissions of any nature whatsoever as such individual
Directors, Board or officers, except for any acts or omissions found by a
court to constitute gross negligence, willful misconduct or fraud.).
164. Id. at ¶ 52 (internal citation omitted).
165. 392 Ill App. 3d 712 (1st Dist. 2009).
166. Id. at 732.
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of duty.”167 There was no mention in Kelley of the duties of honesty,
candor, full disclosure, loyalty, and good faith. Nor are duties of
honesty, candor, or full disclosure discussed in Sherman and to the
extent duties of loyalty and good faith are discussed, they are
discussed in the context of Delaware law and specifically Section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.168
The Boucher court continued its exculpatory clause analysis:
Insofar as the exculpatory clause in the declaration effectively
reasserts the protections of the business judgment rule, like the
business judgment rule, the clause does not justify the order granting
summary judgment here. If the exculpatory clause negates the
defendants’ fundamental fiduciary duties of honesty and loyalty,
where the duty of loyalty entails a duty of full disclosure, the
exculpatory clause conflicts with the Act, and the Act establishes that
the clause becomes ineffective. Thus, the exculpatory clause cannot
justify the order granting the summary judgment motion here.169

Ultimately, the appellate court found that the exculpatory
clause could not be utilized because it would conflict with the
fiduciary duty imposed by the Condominium Property Act.170
However, this analysis is in stark contrast to the Illinois Supreme
Court’s analysis in Kelley and the subsequent cases discussed
herein. In addition to the fact the appellate court did not discuss
any applicable precedent, the appellate court’s analysis had other
deficiencies.
The appellate court begins acknowledging that “the
declaration may limit liability for business decisions made in good
faith.”171 The appellate court, however, failed to identify any basis
for this statement. It appears to flow from the business judgment
rule, but the rule is a rebuttable judicial presumption, which is not
something typically contained in a condominium declaration.
Similarly, Boucher’s reliance on the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Burdett for the proposition that a director must treat unit owners
with the utmost “candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith”
that he would treat himself172 is misplaced. Burdett was a

167. Kelley, 106 Ill.2d at 509.
168. See generally Sherman, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 730 (summarizing section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Business Law and quoting Malpiede, 780
A.2d at 1095: “The purpose of section 102(b)(7) is to permit stockholders to adopt
a provision in the certificate of incorporation to free directors of personal
liability in damages ‘for due care violations, but not duty of loyalty violations,
bad faith claims and certain other conduct.’”).
169. Boucher, 2018 IL App (1st) 162233 at ¶ 52 (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. (stating that “[i]f the exculpatory clause negates the defendants'
fundamental fiduciary duties of honesty and loyalty, where the duty of loyalty
entails a duty of full disclosure, the exculpatory clause conflicts with the Act,
and the Act establishes that the clause becomes ineffective.” (internal citations
omitted)).
171. Id.
172. Boucher, 2018 IL App (1st 162233) at ¶ 36.
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Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act173 case
with a pendent claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Illinois law
pertaining to a tax shelter investment, where a bench trial
judgment was reversed on appeal.174 The case had nothing to do
with condominiums, declarations, or exculpatory clauses. It
generally discusses fiduciary duties that are typically owed by an
agent to his or her principal.175
Further, Boucher’s reliance176 on Janowiak v. Tiesi,177 an
action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by a family business
shareholder against the trustee of the trust that held the stock of
the corporation, provides no guidance or help. The case does not
involve condominiums, declarations, or exculpatory clauses. In the
end, it appears that Boucher either was unaware of the Illinois
Supreme Court precedent and other Illinois cases on point or chose
to ignore them.

VI. CONCLUSION
Illinois has recognized that condominiums and related
homeowner associations may adopt exculpatory clauses in their
declarations to protect directors and officers from liability for claims
alleging breach of fiduciary duty brought by tenants. As this survey
of the case law surrounding Kelley178 demonstrates, the scope of
these exculpatory clauses has been minimally examined in our
courts in more than thirty-five years since they were recognized as
enforceable by the Illinois Supreme Court. The appellate courts
have generally followed Kelley in recognizing exculpatory clauses,
although some have construed the exceptions to exculpation broadly
– perhaps too broadly. As the Illinois legislature has given no
guidance on the subject, condominium developers, associations, and
attorneys need to further explore the breadth of exculpatory clauses
in declarations.

173. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2022).
174. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing
directing judgment for the defendant on the RICO count and remanding for
further proceedings on damages plaintiff suffered by defendant’s breach of
fiduciary duty).
175. Id. at 1381.
176. Boucher, 2018 IL App (1st) 162233 at ¶ 35.
177. 402 Ill. App. 3d 997, 999 (1st Dist. 2010).
178. See Kelley, 106 Ill.2d at 505 (recognizing that exculpatory clauses
limiting directors’ liability as contained in condominium declarations are
enforceable to defeat or limited breach of fiduciary duty claims by unit owners).

